Locke's rights and the maqasid

The modern language of rights owes much to the English philosopher John Locke. In his Second Treatise of Government he argued that people are naturally free and equal, that no one should harm another in “life, health, liberty, or possessions”, and that government is legitimate only when it protects these through law and consent. Islamic law has its own framework, the maqasid al-shariʿah, or objectives of the Shariʿah, which al-Ghazali summarised as the preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage and property. The paper asks how the two compare.

On life, both agree it must be protected. The paper cites the Qur'an's ban on unlawful killing (17:33), the regulated law of retaliation (2:178–179) and the Farewell Pilgrimage, where the Prophet declared people's blood, property and honour sacred. On liberty, both reject arbitrary domination; the Qur'an's “There is no compulsion in religion” (2:256) and the Medinan agreement with Jewish communities are given as examples. The authors add a caution: classical jurists debated apostasy and the limits of religious freedom, so Islamic law should not be presented as identical to modern liberal freedom of conscience.

On property, Locke grounds ownership in a person's own labour. Islam also protects property, forbidding wrongful consumption of wealth (4:29) and guarding orphans' wealth (4:6), but ties it to duties such as zakat (9:60). The biggest difference, the paper argues, is scope. The maqasid also protect intellect, reflected in the ban on intoxicants (5:90–91); family, through rules on marriage and inheritance; and dignity, since Allah has honoured the children of Adam (17:70). Drawing on Jasser Auda, the authors note that modern maqasid scholars extend these into education, freedom of belief and human rights. They also argue these protections were practised in Madinah from the start, not invented later by jurists.

The authors conclude that the maqasid framework is more coherent, because it joins rights with duties and individual protection with public welfare. They stress that this is an evaluative judgment, and that it does not deny Locke's major contribution to limiting tyranny and defending individual freedom.