Four arguments, one God

Debates about God often pit one argument against one objection. A cumulative case works differently: several independent lines of reasoning, each answering a different question, are combined so that together they reach further than any one of them alone. This paper builds such a case for God (Allah) in three steps: that at least one necessary being exists, that this being is personal, and that there can be only one.

The first step draws on the Kalam cosmological argument, in the form made popular by William Lane Craig, and on the contingency argument. A contingent thing is one that could have failed to exist, so it needs something outside itself to explain why it exists. Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Aquinas and Leibniz each argued that such dependent things must ultimately rest on a necessary being, one that exists by its own nature (wajib al-wujud). Modern cosmology, which dates the beginning of the universe to about 13.8 billion years ago, is cited in support.

The second step asks what kind of being this is. Because the cause of space, time and matter cannot itself be part of the physical world, the paper argues that it must be an agent who chooses, not a blind force: in Islamic theology, al-fa'il al-mukhtar. The design argument adds intelligence. The paper points to the fine-tuning of physics, such as the cosmological constant and the strong nuclear force, which must fall within very narrow ranges for stars and life to exist. The third step is oneness. If God is simple, without parts, two such beings could not be told apart; two perfect beings would require one to lack something the other has; and two all-powerful wills could block each other.

The authors conclude that the arguments converge on exactly one personal, necessary being, whom they identify with Allah, while noting that critics offer alternatives such as the multiverse. They close with the Qur'an's invitation to find “signs for those of understanding” in the creation of the heavens and the earth (3:190).